| Documenting the 'division'
         By V N Datta The Sunday Tribune, December 03, 2006
 
 Select Documents  on Partition of Punjab-1947, India  and Pakistan, Punjab, Haryana and Himachal-India, and Punjab-Pakistan. Edited by Kirpal  Singh. National Book Shop, Delhi.  Revised and enlarged edition. Pages LXXVI + 789. Rs 995.  In his preface to the volume under review,  Kirpal Singh writes that his present work is a revised and enlarged edition of  his
  compilation which was published in 1991. The partition of Punjab  has been a special field of Dr Singh’s study and research ever since he  produced his Ph.D. thesis on it. Thereafter, he went to England to  collect and compile his material to form a book. In 1998 he made another trip  to England, and using the  Public Records Office, London,  he added to his compilation some new material from the proceedings of the  British Cabinet. It would have helped the reader if Dr Singh had mentioned  specifically the nature of new material he has incorporated in his new edition  of the book. Dr  Singh has made a definite contribution to the understanding of Sikh religion  and the political history of Punjab. The Punjab source-material is at his fingertips. He is  proficient in the Persian language. His first edition of Partition of Punjab has become a vade mecum for the researcher.
 Since  then, much source material on the partition of Punjab  has been published. Recently, Lionel Carter has brought out two excellent  volumes on the Unionist Party in Punjab  (1937-47). Raghuvendra Tanwar has given a new dimension to the Partition study  by focussing on the public reaction to the traumatic events in the period under  study. The opening of the Cripps papers, the Churchill archives and R.  Coupland’s diaries provide ample material for the revision and reinterpretation  of our views on the Partition of India and Punjab.  The present work has kept the earlier preface intact, though there was a need  for a fresh look at his interpretation of the partition of Punjab.
 Dr  Singh is absolutely right that in the allotment of the major portion of  Gurdaspur district to India,  the Sikh factor was crucial. Supposing that Gurdaspur district was allotted to Pakistan, then Amritsar,  the holy city of the Sikhs, would have been surrounded by the Muslim areas of Sialkot, Jammu and    Kashmir, and Kapurthala.
 In this  connection Mountbatten’s meeting with Lord Radcliffe on April 9, 1947, was  significant. In his letter to Lord Ismay dated April 9, 1947, Mountbatten  wrote: "I said to him (Radcliffe) that the Sikh attitude has become worse  than we had anticipated, and when he was balancing the border of East and West,  I hoped he would keep the Sikh problem in mind." Mountbatten further added  that "generosity to Pakistan  should be more in Bengal than in Punjab since there was no problem in Punjab." Mountbatten’s predecessor too had expressed  similar views and recommended the inclusion of Gurdaspur in East   Punjab.
 Dr  Singh maintains that in the retention of Ferozepur and Zira Tehsil in India the Sikh  pressure worked. This view is not tenable. On the other hand, much pressure was  brought on Mountbatten about Ferozepur and Zira by Jawaharlal Nehru and Sadul  Singh, the ruler of Bikaner  state, who had known Mountbatten since his childhood. Both Mountbatten and  Sadul Singh had served on the staff of the Prince of Wales, later King Edward  VIII. K.M. Panikkar, the Prime Minister of Bikaner state, met Mountbatten on  August 11, 1947. Panikkar told Mountbatten that the ruler of Bikaner  wanted it to be conveyed that if the Ferozepur head works and Ganga water on  which Bikaner’s existence depended were not  allotted to India, then Bikaner would have no option but to join Pakistan. Thus  the boundary in respect of Ferozepur and Zira was changed at the last stage.
 Dr Singh’s scholarly introduction provides a valuable  guide to the documents listed in the volume, and supplies a background to the  crucial events that occurred in Punjab  relating to the partition of the province. He  maintains that the Cabinet Mission proposals paved the way for the success of  the Partition. Singh doesn’t go into the question why the Cabinet Mission  failed.The  East Punjab Liaison Agency records dealing with the recrudescence of violence  in West Punjab provide a vivid and moving  account of the untold misery which the Hindu and Sikh minorities suffered at  the hand of the Muslims. The last 20 pages of the book contain the text of the  interviews which Dr Singh had with some of the leading British personalities  who had played a decisive role in the decision-making process relating to India. Lord  Altlee made two highly significant comments, firstly, that Jinnah was a little,  very little man; and secondly, a very perceptive view—when the Indian political  parties could not settle their contentious issues in any way, what could  Britain do under such circumstances except to partition the country.
 After the country was partitioned, Mountbatten  wrote in his diary that both the countries would regret their decisions in  future. Nehru called it ‘division’. The British thought it ‘partition’. Krishan  Menon said that it was ‘a shock solution.’ But Jinnah said that only future  would tell "whether we were right or wrong".  |