|  | 
       
 
        The Great Calcutta 
        Killings of August 1946 in which both Hindus and Muslims lost lives in 
        the thousands transformed forever the nature of the Congress-Muslim 
        League standoff from a constitutional imbroglio to a violent communal 
        conflagration that culminated in the subcontinent bleeding, burning and 
        partitioned in mid-August 1947. 
 The first attacks on August 16 were the doings of Muslim hoodlums, but 
        their Hindu counterparts retaliated with equal force within a day or 
        two. South Asia's most revolutionary city had been turned into a killing 
        field where poor and innocent blood was spilled without let or hindrance 
        by criminals from the underworld connected to respectable political 
        patrons. A few days later Hindus in Noakhali, East Bengal, were attacked 
        by Muslims and hundreds were killed. In Bombay communal clashes took 
        place at about the same time and the Muslims were on the receiving end.
 
 It was followed by terror let loose on the Muslim minority in Bihar in 
        September-October 1946. Official count of deaths in Bihar was put at 
        3000 and later at 5000, but the Muslim League claimed that at least 8000 
        Muslims were killed. In Garhmuktesar, UP, Muslims were killed in the 
        dozens though the reason for that outrage was not political.
 
 In December 1946, Sikhs and Hindus in Hazara district of NWFP were 
        assaulted by Muslims. Hundreds of deaths and injuries took place and 
        looting of property was widespread. Thousands fled to the Punjab taking 
        refuge mainly in Rawalpindi. It must be said to the full credit of the 
        Punjab Unionist Party that all its leaders, Sir Fazle Hussain, Sir 
        Sikander Hyat and Sir Khizr Tiwana maintained impartial government, and 
        communal peace and harmony were hallmarks of their government. All this 
        was about to change.
 
 Since at least the beginning of 1946, intelligence agencies had been 
        reporting that private armies were being recruited and trained in the 
        Punjab. On January 24, 1947 Punjab Premier Khizr Tiwana banned the 
        Muslim League National Guard and the Rashtriya Swayam Sewak (RSS). The 
        same day the Muslim League's direct action broke out.
 
 A Muslim youth, Abdul Maalik, was killed on February 8 when a brick 
        thrown at a Muslim League procession from a housetop in a Hindu locality 
        of Lahore hit him. On February 24 an off duty Sikh constable was clubbed 
        to death by a Muslim mob in Amritsar. The Punjab was now rapidly 
        converting into a communal powder keg ready to blast any moment. Khizr 
        resigned on March 2. On March 3 Master Tara Singh unsheathed his kirpan 
        (sword) from the steps of the Punjab Legislative Assembly and gave the 
        call to finish off the menace of Pakistan. That evening Sikh and Hindu 
        Mahasabha leaders addressed huge crowds in Lahore making highly 
        provocative speeches. Incited Hindus and Sikhs returning from the 
        meeting killed three totally innocent Muslims when they reached their 
        stronghold of Shahalmi Gate.
 
 Regular communal clashes between armed gangs took place in Lahore and 
        Amritsar on March 4. Knives, axes, long sticks and even firearms were 
        used by both sides. In Multan on March 5 a Hindu-Sikh procession shouted 
        anti-Pakistan slogans. It was immediately attacked by Muslims. Serious 
        rioting followed in the next few days. Dozens of non-Muslims were killed 
        and suffered huge loss of property.
 
 But the most critical rioting took place in the Rawalpindi region. 
        Rawalpindi city had almost a 50-50 per cent Muslim and Hindu-Sikh 
        population balance, but in the district as a whole the Muslims were 80 
        per cent. The Sikhs were the most prosperous community in that district, 
        while the Hindus were mainly small shopkeepers, many engaged in the 
        jewellery business.
 
 On March 5, Sikh-Hindu agitators began shouting anti-Pakistan slogans 
        and were challenged by Muslims. Firearms, stabbings and arson were 
        employed by both sides. Initially the non-Muslims felt they had been 
        successful in driving off Muslims from the streets of Rawalpindi. In the 
        evening of March 6, however, the direction of violence changed from the 
        city to the villages in the district. Suddenly armed Muslims in the 
        thousands began to raid Sikh villages. Neighbouring villages in the 
        Attock and Jhelum districts were also surrounded. In some places the 
        Sikhs fought back, but on the whole the conflict was one-sided.
 
 Subsequent inquiry reports established that the attacks had been planned 
        according to military strategy and tactics and carried out accordingly. 
        These districts were the main recruiting ground for the British Indian 
        Army and the government investigation found abundant evidence of Muslim 
        ex-soldiers taking part in the attacks. Government statistics claim 
        2,000 dead, but Sikhs say that as many as 7,000 lost their lives. My own 
        research, based on visits in December 2004 to some of the villages, 
        suggest that the figure of 2,000 was too low. In some places nearly the 
        whole Sikh and Hindu populations were wiped out. However, the deaths 
        included the Sikhs killing their own women and children rather than 
        letting them fall in the hands of Muslim marauders.
 
 Additionally many Sikhs and Hindus were forcibly converted to Islam. 
        Most of them reverted to their original faith when help arrived. Many 
        women and children were taken away by raiders but most were later 
        recovered. Looting and pillaging of property was the prime reason for 
        the attacks. The raids on the Sikh villages continued for a week: from 
        the evening of March 6 to March 12 or 13. Such villages were only an 
        hour or two away for military trucks to reach from the city. The 
        headquarters of the Northern Command was in Rawalpindi and there was no 
        dearth of troops. But intervention was delayed for too long. Perhaps 
        government preparation for controlling rioting anticipated urban trouble 
        and that it occurred on such a large scale in rural areas surprised the 
        administration, but my research suggests that at least locally there was 
        some sort of conspiracy at work to let the blood-spilling go on for some 
        time. There was an exodus in the thousands of Sikhs from Rawalpindi, 
        Attock and Jhelum districts to the eastern districts and the Sikh 
        princely states; some reports suggest hundreds of thousands left and 
        never returned. It is among them that many members of future Sikh jathas 
        (armed gangs, often on horseback) were recruited that from August 18 
        onwards wreaked havoc on the Muslims of East Punjab.
 
 Meanwhile on March 8, 1947 the Congress in its Delhi session had adopted 
        a resolution supporting the Sikh demand for a partition of the Punjab in 
        which the predominantly non-Muslim areas should be separated from the 
        Muslim areas and given to East Punjab.
 
 
 
 The writer is a visiting senior research fellow at the Institute of 
        South Asian Studies (ISAS), National University of Singapore on leave 
        from the University of Stockholm, Sweden. Email: 
        isasia@nus.edu.sg
   
      BACK TO APNA WEB PAGE |  |